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High School Exit Tests and
the Constitution:
Debra P. v. Turlington
Debra P. v. Turlington' was the first case2 to consider the legal merits
of a statewide minimum competency testing program3 for public school
pupils. The named plaintiffs4 in the class action were Hillsborough
County, Florida students who had failed the state's functional literacy
examination (FLE) and who consequently did not qualify for a standard
high school diploma even though they had completed twelve grades of
school.5 The suit challenged the FLE, its administration, and its statutory
underpinnings as violations of the equal protection and due process
1. 474 F. Supp. 244 (M.D. Fla. 1979).
2. The Florida competency testing program was challenged procedurally before Debra P. See
Florida State Bd. of Educ. v. Brady, - Fla. App. -, 368 So. 2d 661 (1979). North Carolina's
competency program was challenged but the case was dismissed on a standing question. Green v. Hunt,
No. 78-539-CIV-5 (E.D.N.C. April 3, 1979).
3. For background on minimum competency testing (MCT), see R. BOSSONE, MINIMUM
COMPETENCIES: A NATIONAL SURVEY (1978); R. FRAHM & J. COVINGTON, WHAT'S HAPPENING IN
MINIMUM COMPETENCY TESTING (1979); S. NEILL, THE COMPETENCY MOVEMENT: PROBLEMS AND
SOLUTIONS (report to the American Association of School Administrators) (1978); AMERICAN FRIENDS
SERVICE COMMITTEE, A CITIZEN'S INTRODUCTION TO MINIMUM COMPETENCY TESTING PROGRAMS
(1978) [hereinafter cited as CITIZEN'S INTRODUCTION]; Symposium, The Minimum Competency
Testing Movement 59 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 585-625 (1978); Symposium, The Wingspread Papers: A
Report on the Minimum Competency Movement, in NATIONAL ELEMENTARY PRINCIPAL, Jan. 1979, at
12-40. For background on the Florida MCT program, see FLORIDA TEACHING PROFESSION - NATIONAL
EDUCATION ASSOCIATION PANEL, THE FLORIDA ACCOUNTABILITY PROGRAM: AN EVALUATION OF ITS
EDUCATIONAL SOUNDNESS AND IMPLEMENTATION (NEA REPORT) (1978) (summarized in National
Education Association, Impact of Minimum Competency Testing in Florida, TODAY'S EDUCATION,
Sept.-Oct. 1978, at 30; see also Fisher, Florida's Approach to Competency Testing, 59 PHI DELTA
KAPPAN 599 (1978); Glass, Minimum Competence and Incompetence in Florida, 59 PHI DELTA
KAPPAN 602 (1978); Turlington, Good News from Florida: Our Minimum Competency Program is
Working, 60 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 649 (1979). For the legal implications of MCT see Clague, Competen-
cy Testing and Potential Constitutional Challenges of "Everystudent" 28 CATH. U.L. REV. 469 (1979);
Lewis, Certifying Functional Literacy: Competency Testing and Implications for Due Process and
Equal Education Opportunity, 8 J.L. & EDUC. 145 (1979); McClung, Competency Testing Programs:
Legal and Educational Issues, 47 FORDHAM L. REV. 651 (1979); Tractenberg, The Legal Implications qf
Statewide Pupil Performance Standards (1977) (unpublished paper available in microfiche from
Education Resources Information Center); Note, Implications of Minimum Competency lagislation:
A Legal Duty of Care? 10 PAC. L.J. 947 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Legal Duty]. For background on
testing generally, see E. BURNS, THE DEVELOPMENT, USE, AND ABUSE OF EDUCATIONAL TESTS (1979);
THE MYTH OF MEASURABILI fY (P. Houts ed. 1977). The focus of this Comment is on MCT programs
that make passing a competency test a high school graduation requirement.
4. Three classes of plaintiffs were certified:
Class A are all present and future twelfth grade public school students in the State of Florida who
have failed or who hereafter fail the SSAT [State Student Assessment Test hereinafter referred to as the
functional literacy examination (FLE) II].
Class B are all present and future twelfth grade black public school students in the State of Florida
who have failed or who hereafter fail the SSAT II.
Class C are all present and future twelfth grade black public school students in Hillsborough
County, Florida who have failed or who hereafter fail the SSAT IL
The State Commissioner of Education, Ralph D. Turlington, the state and county school boards,
and state and local political and educational officials were named as defendants.
474 F. Supp. at 246.
5. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 232.246, as amended by 1979 Fla. Laws ch. 79-74 (West) provides:
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clauses of the fourteenth amendment,6 Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964,7 and the Equal Educational Opportunity Act.8 The federal district
court granted the plaintiffs' injunctive relief and held that Florida could
not deny diplomas on the basis of FLE results until the 1982-83 academic
year.9 The case is significant because statewide minimum competency
testing programs similar to Florida's have been adopted by a number of
other states10 and many of the issues raised in Debra P. are relevant to these
other programs.
This Comment provides a brief overview of the minimum competency
movement and the controversy it has created. The Comment then critically
examines the Debra P. opinion. Section III suggests an alternative
analytical approach. The concluding section discusses the implications of
Debra P.
I. Debra P. v. Turlington
A. Background of Minimum Competency Testing (MCT)
MCT Statutes have been enacted in state after state in response to
widespread discontent with the public schools and distressing evidence of
(I) Beginning with the 1978-79 school year, each district school board shall establish standards
for graduation from its schools which shall include as a minimum:
(a) Mastery of the minimum performance standards in reading, writing and mathematics
for the 1 th grade, established pursuant to §§ 229.565 and 229.57, determined in the manner
prescribed after a public hearing and consideration by the state board;
(b) Demonstrated ability to successfully apply basic skills to everyday life situations as
measured by a functional literacy examination developed and administered in a manner pres-
cribed after a public hearing and consideration by the state board; and
(c) Completion of a minimum number of academic credits, and all other applicable
requirements prescribed by the district school board pursuant to § 232.245 ...
(3) A student who meets all requirements prescribed in subsection (I) shall be awarded a
standard diploma in a form prescribed by the state board; provided that a school board may, in lieu of
the standard diploma, award differentiated diplomas to those exceeding the prescribed minimums. A
student who completes the minimum number of credits and other requirements prescribed by para-
graph (1) (c), but is unable to meet the standards of paragraph (1) (a) or paragraph (1) (b), shall be
awarded a certificate of completion in a form prescribed by the state board. However, any student who
is otherwise entitled to a certificate of completion may, in the alternative, elect to remain in the
secondary school on either a full-time or part-time basis for up to 1 additional year and receive special
instruction designed to remediate his identified deficiencies.
6. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1: "No state shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws."
7. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976).
8. 20 U.S.C. § 1703 (1976).
9. 474 F. Supp. at 269.
10. For a state by state breakdown of MCT and brief descriptions of the particular programs, see
NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATIONAL STATISTICS (NCES), THE CONDITION OF EDUCATION:
STATISTICAL REPORT 68, 69 (1979); Pipho, State Activity in Minimum Competency Testing, 59 PHI
DELTA KAPPAN 585, 587-88 (1978). For bibliography and a more extensive state by state listing, seeR.
Bossone, supra note 3, at 108-18 (1978). The enacted MCT programs, like the Florida program, have
been subject to a considerable amount of legislative tinkering, and other states are considering MCT
proposals.
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poor academic performance." The American Friends Service Committee
has expressed the concerns of these groups:
Manyparents are disturbed when they find their children cannot read, write,
or compute at a level the parents think is necessary.
Many educators are concerned because high school students' scores on
standardized tests such as the Scholastic Aptitude Test are declining.
Many college instructors are upset when they find some students can't write a
coherent paragraph.
12
Many employers are angry when young job applicants can't fill out an
application, follow simple written directions, or can't read well enough
to perform even simple job tasks.13
It should be added that many students, too, are dissatisfied with the quality
of their schooling.1
4
Declining college admissions test scores,15  grade inflation,'
16
educational malpractice suits, 17 and breakdowns in school discipline have
been well publicized and have, in turn, spurred the development of
competency programs.
Minimum competency legislation mandates a quantifiable minimum
competence. To be promoted or to graduate, the student must
11. The most frequently cited evidence of educational decline is the steady dip in Scholastic
Aptitude Test (SAT) scores since the early 1960's. See COLLEGE ENTRANCE EXAMINATION BOARD
(CEEB), ON FURTHER EXAMINATION, REPORT OF THE ADVISORY PANEL ON THE SCHOLASTIC APTITUDE
TEST SCORE DECLINE (1977). The panel's findings were not conclusive, but demographic changes in the
test taking population, e.g., a higher percentage of minority and low income test takers, were believed
to account for two-thirds to three-fourths of the overall decline. The findings are summarized in
Cawelti, National Competency Testing: A Bogus Solution, 59 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 619, 619-20 (1978).
But see P. COPPERMAN, THE LITERACY HOAX 40 (1978) (demographic shifts between 1952 and 1963, a
period of rising test scores, were greater than those between 1963 and 1977).
12. E.g., Ohio State University (OSU) President Harold Enarson supports competency testing
because OSU now must operate an expensive remedial program in English (and math) for incoming
freshmen who are not prepared for college level subjects. Enarson's views are reported in OSU Lantern,
Feb. 7, 1980, at I, col. I. As president of an open admissions university, Enarson's position is
understandable. It is, however, simplistic to think that the 20-25 percent of incoming OSU freshmen
who must take remedial English would not pass a high school competency test. The politics of
competency testing militate. against withholding diplomas from too many students. See Bickell, Seven
Key Notes on Minimum Competency Testing, 59 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 589 (1978). Moreover, the OSU
English department found that placement of students in remedial classes solely on the basis of scores on
the American College Test (ACT) resulted in an erroneous placement rate of about 30 percent. See
GARNES, ET AL, REPORT OF THE WRITING WORKSHOP: BASIC WRITING AT THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY
9, 190 (1979).
13. CITIZEN'S INTRODUCTION, supra note 3, at 2 (emphasis in original).
14. See, e.g., P. COPPERMAN, supra note 11, at 222-249 passim (interviews with students
reflecting concerns about the general lack of educational quality).
15. See supra note 11.
16. For a report on grade inflation, see Bromley, Crow & Gibson, Grade Inflation: Trends,
Causes, and Implications, 59 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 694 (1978).
17. See, e.g., Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 60 Cal. App. 3d. 814, 131 Cal. Reptr.
854 (Ct. App. 1976); Hoffman v. Board of Educ., 49 N.Y.2d 121,424 N.Y.S.2d 376 (1979); Donahue v.
Copiaque Union Free School Dist., 64 A.D.2d. 29,407 N.Y.S.2d. 874 (1978); Doe v. Board of Educ., 48
U.S.L.W. 2077 (Md. Cir. Ct. 1979). These cases found no cause of action for educational malpractice.
But see the discussion in Tractenberg, supra note 3, at 9-11, which considers standards such as those
imposed by MCT programs in the educational malpractice context. See also Lewis, supra note 3, at
182; McClung, supra note 3, at 661; Legal Duty, supra note 3.
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demonstrate that he or she is at least minimally qualified in the basics of
reading, writing, and numeracy. Typically, this demonstrable minimum is
to be determined by the student's score on a standardized objective test."
While the laws and programs vary considerably throughout the nation, 9
the common goal in every program is that students actually possess a
measured minimum academic competence, or, as it is often phrased, that
students upon graduation are "functionally literate."
While no one in education contends that students should not be
competent upon graduation or that present educational practices cannot
be improved, many question whether statewide (or national)20 MCT can
solve the problem of chronic underachievement in the nation's classrooms.
Consequently, MCT has become one of the significant controversies in
contemporary American education.
Proponents of MCT assert that the programs are necessary for the
following reasons: (I) an MCT requirement restores meaning to a high
school diploma; present diplomas represent little more than "seat-time;
' 21
(2) MCT programs set explicit standards, 22 which are needed to combat
social promotions23 and functionally illiterate graduates; (3) minimum
standards counterbalance the relaxed academic environment created by
curricular and instructional frills and innovations;24 (4) MCT diagnoses
18. Some competency programs, generally those developed at the local level, use methods of
evaluation broader than standardized testing. These other measures may include writing paragraphs or
oral presentations. See, e.g., Henderson, Gary, Indiana: High School Diplomas with Meaning, 59 PHI
DELTA KAPPAN 613 (1978).
19. There are three major points of distinction in the various programs. The first is whether the
test measures basic skills (school skills) or adult life (functional literacy) skills. Florida's program
includes both elements. See note 5 supra. The second difference is the administrative levelat which the
competency test is developed and administered. Florida has a single statewide program. California, on
the other hand, empowers local districts to implement their own programs. See CAL. EDUC. CODE §§
51215, 51217 (\Vest 1978 and Supp. 1979). The most significant distinction, however, is whether
passing the test is to be a graduation requirement. The majority of the states that have adopted
competency testing have linked the test to the diploma. See NCES, supra note 10 at 68; Pipho, supra
note 10.
20. See Cawelti, supra note 11. Rep. Ronald Mottl, Ohio, has proposed a national testing
program. H.R. 9574, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. (1977). The U.S. Department of Health, Education and
Welfare (HEW), however, took a cautious position on statewide MCT in a policy draft. The NEA
REPORT, supra note 3, at 8, quoted this language from the HEW draft: "The late imposition of a
requirement for graduation [of] passing a competency test limits a student's opportunity to fully
participate in the education process, and in Society, because (s)he does not have sufficient timeto meet
the requirement."
Secretary of Education Hufstedler is "suspicious" of tests, particularly if"the youngsters who were
given the test were not given the education to pass them." N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 1980, at 19. On another
occasion, Secretary Hufstedler stated that as a result of testing"[k]ids ended up with labels that were in
many respects almost as destructive as tattooing numbers on prisoners." Columbus Dispatch, Jan. 16,
1980, at A-12, Col. 1. For a summary of federal involvement in testing, see Shoemaker, The Federal
Approach to Testing, 58 EDUCATIONAL HORIZONs 20-25 (Fall 1979).
21. See Fisher, supra note 3, at 599, 601.
22. See, e.g., Florida's standards, set forth in note 44 infra.
23. Social promotion is the practice of advancing a pupil from grade to grade automatically
whether or not the pupil has achieved passing marks.
24. "In part the minimum competency testing movement reflects the back-to-basics movement,
one aspect of a backlash against . . . the 'funsie-wunsie open education' philosophy of the 1960's."
Haney and Madaus, Symposium: Wingspread Papers, NATIONAL ELEMENTARY PRINCIPAL, Jan. 1979,
[Vol. 41:11131116
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student weaknesses and can indicate what needs to be stressed in the
classroom; (5) MCT programs ensure that minority and poor students,
who have been "passed through" the system for years, attain an acceptable
minimum level of proficiency before graduation; (6) linking graduation to
a passing score on the competency test provides a direct incentive for
students to learn;25 (7) MCT gives legislators and the public a standard of
accountability by which the efficacy of school expenditures and the
efficiency of school personnel can be assessed;2 6 and (8) MCT can improve
the somewhat tarnished image of public education and thereby generate
citizen support for the schools.27
Opponents of MCT argue that the testing programs are likely to
create more problems than they solve. 28 Their specific objections include
the following: (1) MCT is an unsound psychometric practice in that it bases
a profoundly important decision-whether to award or withhold a
diploma-on a single variable;29 (2) some MCT programs have been
enacted so hastily that students have not had time to be taught or have not
been taught adequately the skills needed to pass them;30 (3) cut-scores are
determined by political rather than psychometric criteria;3 (4) MCT
narrows the curriculum because teachers will "teach the test" to the
at 15, 16. The fact that most schools were immune to this "funsie-wunsie philosophy" diminishes the
force of the argument. See, e.g., Gross, The Status of the Social Studies in the Public Schools of the
United States: Facts and Impressions of a National Survey SOCIAL EDUCATION March 1977, 194 (new
social studies curricula seldom implemented at classroom level).
25. See Fisher, supra note 3, at 601; Turlington, supra note 3, at 650.
26. See Baratz in Symposium: Wingspread Papers, NATIONAL ELEMENTARY PRINCIPAL, Jan.
1979, 20, 21-22.
27. Turlington, supra note 3, at 649-50.
28. The National Academy of Education Committee on Testing and Basic Skills (NAEd.) stated:
"The NAEd Panel believes that any setting of statewide minimum competency standards for awarding
the high school diploma . . . is basically unworkable, exceeds the present measurement arts of the
teaching profession, and will create more social problems than it can conceivably solve." NATIONAL
ACADEMY OF EDUCATION COMMITTEE ON TESTING AND BASIC SKILLS, REPORT TO THE ASSISTANT
SECRETARY FOR EDUCATION: IMPROVING EDUCATIONAL ACHIEVEMENT 9 (1978).
29. See AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION (APA), STANDARDS FOR EDUCATIONAL AND
PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTS AND MANUALS (1974). Test use standards include the following:
A test user should consider more than one variable for assessment and the assessment of
any given variable by more than one method.
Comment: For most purposes, the evaluation of a person requires description that is
both broad and precise; a single assessment or assessment procedure rarely provides all
relevant facets of a description ...
Test users should also consider more than one method of assessment. Even a test yielding
generally valid scores may in an individual case be susceptible to idiosyncratic errors of
interpretation, and a pattern of confirming or modifying assessments may be useful. Confi-
dence in inferences drawn from assessments may be increased by varying the sources and
increasing the amount of information on which the inferences are made. In addition to tests,
one might consider ratings, references, observations of actual performance, etc.
Id. at 61-62. Accord, NEA REPORT, supra note 3, at 8 ("The accepted educational practice when
making important educational decisions about a child is to obtain and consider evidence from several
sources, including grades given by teachers who have had many hours of contact with the student.").
30. See text accompanying notes 110-13 infra.
31. See Glass, supra note 3; Bickell, Seven Key Notes on Minimum Competency Testing, 59 PHI
DELTA KAPPAN 589, 591 (1978) ("How many students can your school or state afford-both economi-
cally and politically-to remediate, or not promote, or not graduate if remediation fails?").
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exclusion of other subject matter;32 (5) the MCT achievement "floor" tends
to become a "ceiling" and the pursuit of educational excellence is
sidetracked; (6) MCT represents a form of "false-advertising" because so-
called functional, "real-world" skills cannot adequately be evaluated by a
paper and pencil test;33 (7) MCT is expensive because of test development
costs, test administration costs, and costs associated with remediation; (8)
MCT reduces the holding-power of the schools and results in higher
dropout rates; 34 (9) MCT singles out the individual student to bear the
blame for failure because "legislators, school board members, ad-
ministrators, or teachers are not subject to comparable penalties for their
failure to create necessary programs, provide quality instruction, or
appropriate the money that will help students learn the basic skills; '35 (10)
MCT imposes a disproportionate burden on minority youngsters who fail
the tests with much greater frequency than white middle-class pupils;
36
and (11) MCT is a simplistic response to the longstanding problem of un-
derachievement, a problem that is as old as American public schooling.37
32. See NEA REPORT, supra note 3, at 8-9 (emphasis on elementary reading and arithmetic at
expense of high school science, history, and literature).
33. See Nathan & Jennings, Educational Bait-and-Switch, 59 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 621 (1978).
34. Willard Wirtz, chairman of the CEEB panel, made this comment:
There is reason to doubt whether the averages on many of the standardized tests would have
gone down significantly over the past ten years if it hadn't been for the effects, both direct and
indirect, of the increased high-school retention rate that came about in the United States
during the 1960's. It is reasonable to accept increased testing as part of the course of action
that is necessary to shore up minimum competencies. But unless a reasonable affirmative-
action program is instituted, the consequences of increased competency testing will certainly
be an upturn in what we have called the "dropout" rate. The test-score averages of those
staying in school will go up, but we won't know from these figures what has happened to the
education of youth as a whole.
Wirtz, What Shall We Do About Declining Test Scores, in 1978 CONFERENCE SERIES, AMERICAN
ASSOCIATION FOR HIGHER EDUCATION, at 4. One superintendant was quoted on the matter of dropouts
as saying: "Students who drop out because of the tests probably would have dropped out anyway,
because they are students who are unable or not interested in getting the diploma." The statement
appears in Til, One Way of Looking At It, 59 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 556 (1978). Another explanation for
why students who fail the tests drop out was advanced by Milton Morris, an NAACP attorney and
counsel in Debra P.: "Kids would be better off dropping out of school at the end of their senior year
than being stigmatized by a Certificate of Attendance as certified dummies." Quoted in McClung,
supra note 3, at 660 n.45.
35. CITIZENS' INTRODUCTION, supra note 3, at 8.
36. Id. at 6-7.
37. See, eg., R. HOFSTADTER, ANTI-INTELLECTUALISM IN AMERICAN LIFE(1964): "The history of
our educational writing poses a formidable challenge to those modern educational critics who yield too
readily to nostalgia for good old days that apparently were never too good." Id. at 301. Hofstadter
supplies examples beginning with Horace Mann, who in the 1840's wrote that "the schools have
retrograded within the last generation or half generation in regard to orthography." Id. at 302. An 1870
critic declared that "[h]undreds of our American schools are little less than undisciplined juvenile
mobs." Id. at 303. The most contemporary sounding complaint was culled from a 1902 New York Sun
editorial:
When we were boys, boys had to do a little work in school. They were not coaxed; they
were hammered. Spelling, writing, and arithmetic were not electives, and you had to learn. In
these more fortunate times, elementary education has become in many places a vaudeville
show. The child must be kept amused, and learns what he pleases. Many sage teachers scom
the old-fashioned rudiments, and it seems to be regarded as between a misfortune and a crime
for a child to learn to read.
Id. The modem criticism of school outcomes can be traced back at least to the publication of R.
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Educational policy makers must consider and resolve these issues.
This educational debate, however, takes on a legal dimension because
MCT programs that predicate high school graduation on passing a test
threaten important personal interests. The penalty imposed on those who
fail to measure up is denial of a high school diploma, the universal
credential for employment or further educational opportunity.
B. Facts and Holding of Debra P. v. Turlington
1. Facts
In 1976, Florida was one of the first states to enact a statewide
educational accountability program with minimum performance stan-
dards.38 A 1978 amendment mandated that students who demonstrated
their knowledge of basic skills and passed the competency test developed
by the State Department of Education would receive a standard diploma
while those who failed the FLE would only be entitled to a nebulous "cer-
tificate of completion."" A certificate of completion would not be consid-
ered a diploma for purposes of employment with the state or for admission
to state-supported universities.40
The statute called for a relatively brief planning and preimplemen-
tation period. Consequently, the Florida Department of Education was
subject to enormous time pressures to develop a coherent program that
would be in place by the 1978-79 school year.4' Moreover, until the
1976 Accountability Act was passed, there had been little or no centralized
control of Florida's public schools. 42 Local boards operated autono-
mously and as a result curricular offerings varied markedly from district
to district.43 Nevertheless, the state school administrators were able to
define curricular objectives and contract with test publishers who devel-
oped test instruments based on these objectives. 44 The process was com-
FLESCH, WHY JOHNNY CAN'T READ (1955). Thus, there is some basis for the conclusion that "[m]ini-
mum competency testing is simply the latest verse in [an] old refrain." Haney & Madaus, supra note 24,
at 15.
The academic value of the degrees granted by American schools has also been subject to criticism
through the years. The criticism dates back to the colonial period. One colonist made this complaint in
1773: "[Ilgnorance wanders unmolested at our colleges, examinations are dwindled to meer [sic] form
and ceremony, and after four years dozing there, no one is ever refused the honours of a degree, on
account of dulness [sic] and insufficiency." D. BOORSTIN, THE AMERICANS: THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE
182 (195).
38. FLA. STAT. ANN §229.55-58 (West 1977 & West Supp. 1980).
39. See note 5 supra. (The 1979 amendment added the optional thirteenth year program).
40. 474 F. Supp. at 249.
41. Id. at 257.
42. Id. at 264.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 259 n.22. The objectives were:
(a) Communications.
The student will, in a real world situation, determine the main idea inferred from a
selection.
The student will, in a real world situation, find who, what, where, which, and how
information in a selection.
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pleted in time to meet the legislative requirements. The tests were then
preliminarily screened in a few local districts before being administered
statewide.45 While the results of the pilot tests were alarming, the results of
the initial statewide administration in October, 1977, were disastrous and
caused national notoriety.46 Thirty-six percent of the 115,000 students who
took the FLE failed both the communications and mathematics sections
with a failure rate of 78 percent on both sections for blacks and 25 percent
for whites. 47 The second adminstration of the test brought similar racial
results as 74 percent of the black students failed one or both areas as
opposed to 25 percent of the white students. 48 After a third attempt at the
test some 20 percent of the black twelfth-graders had not passed while the
The student will, in a real world situation, determine the inferred cause and effect of an
action.
The student will, in a real world situation, distinguish between facts and opinions.
The student will, in a real world situation, identify an unstated opinion.
The student will, in a real world situation, identify the appropriate source to obtain
information on a topic.
The student will, in a real world situation, use an index to identify the location of
information requiring the use of cross-references.
The student will use highway and city maps.
The student will include the necessary information when writing letters to supply or
request information.
The student will complete a check and its stub accurately.
The student will accurately complete forms used to apply for a driver's license,
employment, entrance to a school or training program, insurance, and credit.
(b) Mathematics
The student will determine the elapsed time between two (2) events stated in seconds,
minutes, hours, days, weeks, months, or years.
The student will determine equivalent amounts of up to one hundred dollars (S100.00)
using coins and paper currency.
The student will determine the solution to real world problems involving one (1) or two
(2) distinct whole number operations.
The student will determine the solution to real world problems involving decimal
fractions or percents and one (I) or two (2) distinct operations.
The student will determine the solution to real world problems involving comparison
shopping.
The student will determine the solution to real world problems involving rate of interest
and the estimation of the amount of simple interest.
The student will determine the solution to real world problems involving purchases and a
rate of sales tax.
The student willdetermine the solution to real world problems involving purchases and a
rate of discount given in fraction or percent form.
The student will solve a problem related to length, width, or height using metric or
customary units up to kilometers and miles, conversion within the system.
The student will solve a problem involving the area of a rectangular region using metric
or customary units.
The student will solve a problem involving capacity using units given in a table
(milliliters, liters, teaspoons, cups, pints, quarts, gallons), conversion within the system.
The student will solve a problem involving weight using units given in a table
(milligrams, grams, kilograms, metric tons, ounces, pounds, tons), conversion within the
system.
The student will read and determine relationships described by line graphs, circle graphs,
and tables.
45. Id. at 258. See also Fisher, supra note 3, at 600.
46. TIME Dec. 12, 1977, at 22 trumpeted "Florida Flunks." The story told of worried seniors who
scurried over the border to enroll in Georgia high schools. Id.
47. 474 F. Supp. at 248.
48. Id. at 248.
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percentage of whites who failed it diminished to less than 2 percent.49 In the
wake of these test results, suit was filed against state and local education
officials.
2. Plaintiffs' Claims
Plaintiffs advanced three specific claims for relief. The first claim
alleged equal protection violations based on Florida's prior history of
purposeful racial discrimination, the natural, probable, and foreseeable
discriminatory effect of the statutory scheme, the invalidity, unreliability,
and racial bias of the test instrument, and the exemption given to Florida's
95 percent white enrollment private schools from the functional literacy
examination requirement.5 °
The second claim alleged violations of due process. The primary
allegations in that claim were that the testing program was initiated with-
out adequate pretest notice and that the defendants had not ensured that
"there [was] a match between institution and curriculum ... in all the
areas covered by the test."51
The final claim was directed at the remedial programs mandated for
students who failed the FLE. Plaintiffs contended that these remedial
clauses had a resegregative effect because disproportionately high num-
bers of black pupils were enrolled in these classes. 2
3. Holding
The court held that the FLE, as administered, and its attendant
diploma sanction violated the equal protection clause because "past
purposeful discrimination .. . is perpetuated by the test and the diploma
sanction regardless of its neutrality. '' 53 Further, the court stated that
"punishing the victims of past discrimination for deficits created by an
inferior educational environment neither constitutes a remedy nor creates
better educational opportunities. 4
The court also found that inadequate pretest notice constituted a
violation of the due process clause in that the implementation schedule was
"fundamentally unfair."55 Notwithstanding the court's reluctance "to
interfere in the operations of the Florida public schools, '56 it rebuffed the
defendants' argument that the momentum and credibility of Florida public
education would be compromised if the test and the testing schedule were
invalidated or delayed. 7
49. Id. at 249.
50. Complaint at 13-15, Debra P. v. Turlington, 474 F. Supp. 244 (M.D. Fla. 1979).
51. Id. at 15-16.
52. Id. at 16-17.
53. 474 F. Supp. at 254-55.
54. Id. at 257.
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The court found no violation in the assignment of students to
disproportionately black remedial classes because "the testing program
along with the compensatory education classes, . . . will remedy the
present effects of past discrimination .... "58 This approval, however,
was conditioned on the continued development of an effective remedial
program.5 9
The court enjoined the state from requiring a passing score on the
FLE as a graduation requirement until 1982-83.6o The rationale for this
date was that Florida had operated an essentially nonsegregated school
system since 1971 and as a result the class of 1983 would not be tainted by
prior segregated schooling.6' The court attributed considerable signifi-
cance to the fact that plaintiffs had attended segregated schools for the
critical first four years of their educational careers. 2 The four year delay
would also permit the state to remedy the due process violation caused by
the inadequate phase-in schedule.
The court specifically did not enjoin the state from using the FLE for
remedial and diagnostic purposes.63 Nor did it find the private school
exemption to be unconstitutional. 4
II. CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF Debra P.
A. Due Process
1. The Interests Imperiled
The interests imperiled by Florida's statewide minimum competency
testing program are substantial. A high school diploma has become the
58. Id. at 268. This Comment does not further discuss the court's ruling on the effect of the
disproportionately black remedial classes. The fact that students were moving through these classes
and that the classes met for only part of the school day governed the court's finding. These factors
parallel federal regulations on ability grouping. 45 C.F.R. § 185.43(c) (2)-(3) (1979).
59. 474 F. Supp. at 268.
60. Id. at 269.
61. Id. at 251-52, 269.
62. Id. at 251-52. See also FLA. STATs. ANN § 230.2311(1) as amended by 1979 Fla. Laws ch.79-
74:
(1) The Legislature recognizes that the early years of a pupil's education are crucial to
his future and that mastery of the basic skills of communication and computation is essential
to the future educational and personal success of an individual. The first priority of the public
schools of Florida shall be to assure that all Floridians, to the extent their individual physical,
mental, and emotional capacities permit, shall achieve mastery of the basic skills. The term
"basic skills," for the purposes of this section, means reading, writing, and arithmetic. Early
childhood and basic skills development programs shall be made available by the school
districts to all students, especially those enrolled in kindergarten and grades I through 3, and
shall provide effective, meaningful, and relevant educational experiences designed to give
students at least the minimum skills necessary to function and survive in today's society.
(emphasis added).
63. 274 F. Supp. at 269.
64. Id. at 262-63. The court cited San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
1 (1972) (wealth not a suspect classification), and Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979) (rational for
state to concentrate efforts on the schools it controls directly).
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basic credential for employment and higher educational opportunities. 65
Denial of a standard diploma therefore has a devastating effect on future
prospects in an increasingly credential-conscious society. Moreover, a
liberty interest in personal reputation is threatened by the testing program
because the stigmatizing epithet "functional illiterate" attaches to students
who fail the FLE.66 This stigmatization is particularly severe because it is
applied to young people at the threshold of adulthood and must be borne
throughout their adult lives.
a. Property Interest in a High School Diploma
The court found that the plaintiffs had a "property right in graduation
from high school with a standard diploma., 67 It based this finding on Goss
v.Lopez,68 which held that students' "legitimate claims of entitlement to a
public education ' 69 could not be denied for a disciplinary violation
without procedural due process. If the right to a public education exists by
virtue of the state's operating schools and compelling attendance, the right
to a diploma, the tangible benefit of education, is a logical corollary.70
While the high school diploma in recent years has been maligned for
meaning less in terms of achievement than it has ever meant before, it has
taken on an even greater significance in terms of subsequent educational
and employment opportunities.71 In years past, employers and even higher
educational institutions would overlook the absence of a high school
diploma if the applicant could otherwise demonstrate his or her ability.
Entrance to jobs and post-secondary schooling today, however, requires
the diploma even if the diploma bears little or no relationship to the actual
job or course of study.72
Moreover, as one commentator has noted, "the state's massive
restraint on a child's liberty, by compelling attendance upon school for six
hours a day, 180 days a year, for up to ten years can only be justified if some
minimal benefit is guaranteed to flow therefrom. 73 The duty to attend
65. See I. BERG, EDUCATION AND JOBS: THE GREAT TRAINING ROBBERY (1970); D. HAPGOOD,
DIPLOMAISM (1971).
66. See text accompanying note 76 infra.
67. 474 F. Supp. at 266.
68. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
69. Id. at 573.
70. If, by reason of the socio-economic factors of our times an individual may not be
deprived of an equal opportunity to obtain whatever education may be provided by a
State . . ., then afortiori one may not be arbitrarily deprived of whatever certificate,
diploma or other evidence of that education maybe provided. Goldwynv. Allen, 54 Misc. 2d
94, 99, 281 N.Y.S.2d 899, 905 (Sup. Ct. 1967).
71. I. BERG, supra note 65, at 185 ("Educational credentials have become the new property in
America."). See also D. HAPGOOD, supra note 65 at 9 ("The career market is closing its doors to those
without degrees.").
72. Diplomas are screening devices for personnel officers who need "something to cut the sheer
numbers [of job applicants] down ...."I. BERG, supra note 65, at 78.
73. Dimond, The Constitutional Right to Education: The Quiet Revolution, 24 HASTINGS L.J.
1087, 1123 (1973).
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school is a child's "work." Regular promotion and progression from grade
to grade create legitimate expectations not dissimilar from those held by
adult workers who receive raises or increased job status according to a
schedule.74 The current furor about "social promotions' 75 should not
obscure the fact that students do fail academically and many are retained
at grade level.76 Promotions are not automatic and the expectations
engendered by them should not be totally discounted. Graduation and the
receipt of a diploma are the natural culminating events of a high school
career.77 Anticipation of these events may bear heavily on a student's
decision to remain in school after he or she has passed the age of
compulsory attendance. The promise of a diploma and its appurtenant
benefits thus can motivate students to complete high school, particularly if
they receive arguably positive reinforcement in the form of annual
promotions based on their teachers' evaluations of their performance. The
diploma should be viewed as a major benefit accruing to those who have
met the traditional conditions of their "employment"--regular attendance
and passing grades.
b. Liberty Interest in Personal Reputation
The Debra P. court repeatedly acknowledged "a very serious
problem '78 in the likelihood that students who failed the FLE would be
stigmatized because "the term 'functional illiterate' has a universally
negative inference and connotation. While 'illiteracy' is itself a negative
and impact ladened word, !functional illiteracy' further compounds these
implications by focusing on the individual's inability to operate effectively
in society. ' 79 At another point in the opinion, the court, citing Wisconsin v.
74. The legitimacy of expectations was the distinguishing feature between Board of Regents v.
Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) and its companion case, Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972). The
plaintiff in Roth, a first year teacher who had a one year contract, was held not to have had a protected
property interest in continued employment. In Perry, the plaintiff-teacher was held to have had a
protected interest in continued employment because his ten years of prior service gave rise to protected
rights under the school's informal tenure system. The Debra P. opinion punctuated the expectative
interest: "Graduation is the logical extension of successful attendance." 274 F. Supp. at 266.
75. This furor about social promotions should not obscure two points. First, social promotion is
venerable. It appears in the most famous of American educations: "In the one branch he [Adams] most
needed-mathematics-barring the first few scholars, failure was so nearly universal that no attempt at
grading could have had value, and whether he stood fortieth or ninetieth must have been an accident or
the personal favor of the professor." H. ADAMS, THE EDUCATION OF HENRY ADAMS 60 (1918). Social
promotion was utilized as a cost-cutting measure in the heyday of scientific educational management
some sixty years ago. See R. CALLAHAN, EDUCATION AND THE CULT OF EFFICIENCY 166 (1962). Second,
the research on social promotion, which has been conducted at various times during the last seventy
years, indicates that retention at grade level is generally less educationally efficacious than a
promotion. This research is summarized in Cawelti, supra note 11, at 621.
76. "The classroom teacher . . . annually flunks more than one million students." Cawelti,
supra note 11, at 620 (emphasis in original).
77. See note 74 supra.
78. 474 F. Supp. at 249.
79. Id. at 258 (emphasis in original).
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Constantineau,80 stated that "the plaintiffs ha[d] a liberty interest in being
free of the adverse stigma associated with the certificate of completion."8
Constantineau struck down a state statute that called for "posting",
without notice or a hearing, the names of known "excessive drinkers" in
establishments selling liquor. The court held that "where the State attaches
'a badge of infamy' to the citizen, due process comes into play. 82 Paul v.
Davis,83 in upholding the distribution of "known shoplifter" lists
containing the names of unconvicted persons, cut back on the broadly
defined reputation interest enunciated in Constantineau. Pauldistinguish-
ed the earlier case on the basis that Constantineau concerned an
"alteration in legal status. 8 4 Paul held that due process protection of a
liberty interest in one's good name would attach only when the stigma
amounted to a change in status. Even under the more restrictive Paul test
the Florida students' interest should be protected. Not only is their
reputation besmirched by the stigmatizing epithet "functional illiterate"
but also a change in status results from receiving a certificate of completion
instead of a standard diploma because certificate holders would be
ineligible for certain categories of state employment and admission to state
universities.85
The fact that the names of certificate recipients would not be publicly
disclosed in a formal manner would not substantially diminish the degree
of stigmatization. The "grapevine" in an American high school permits
few secrets; it is naive to hope that certificate holders would be able to
remain anonymous. More importantly, the certificated student would
have to reveal his status whenever it really mattered to him, as when
applying for a job or seeking additional education. 86 Thus, absence of a
formal publication should not impede finding that a stigma results from
the certificate of completion under Constantineau or Paul.
2. Academic Evaluations and Due Process
a. The Traditional View
While courts have been slow to intervene in the affairs of schools
generally, 87 they have been extraordinarily reluctant to become embroiled
80. 400 U.S. 433 (1971).
81. 274 F. Supp. at 266.
82. 400 U.S. at 437.
83. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
84. Id. at 708.
85. See text accompanying note 40 supra.
86. The cases that have upheld the firing of public employees without a hearing have stressed
that the individual was "as free as before" to seek another job. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,
575 (1972); Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 348 (1976) (quoting Roth). The certificate holder, in
contrast, would be locked out of certain opportunities. See text accompanying note 40 supra.
87. "Judicial interposition in the operation of the public school system of the Nation raises
problems requiring care and restraint. . . .By and large, public education in our Nation is committed
to the control of state and local authorities." Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968).
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in academic performance controversies particularly.8 8 The customary
response has been to show great deference to the expertise of educational
decisionmakers unless the challenged decision is clearly arbitrary or
capricious. Although most of the recent litigation contesting evaluations
of scholastic performance has been instigated by graduate or professional
students, there are some older cases that consider evaluations of academic
performance at the elementary and secondary school level.89 Barnard v.
Inhabitants of Shelburne" typifies the early cases that arose in the public
school context. The Barnard court rejected the plaintiff's claim that he was
wrongfully excluded from high school for his scholastic deficiences and
stated:
The care and management of schools, vested in the school committee,
includes the establishment and maintenance of standards for the promotion
of pupils from one grade to another and for their continuance as members of
any particular class. So long as the school committee act [sic] in good faith
their conduct in formulating and applying standards and making decisions
touching this matter is not subject to review by any other tribunal.91
Most modern cases follow the arbitrary or capricious standard. Connelly
v. University of Vermont and State Agricultural College92 enunciated this
standard in the context of the academic dismissal of a third-year medical
student.
The effect of these decisions is to give the school authorities absolute
discretion in determining whether a student has been delinquent in his
studies, and to place the burden on the student of showing that his dismissal
was motivated by arbitrariness, capriciousness or bad faith. The reason for
this rule is that in matters of scholarship, the school authorities are uniquely
qualified by training and experience to judge the qualifications of a student,
and efficiency of instruction depends in no small degree upon the school
faculty's freedom from interference from other noneducational tribunals. It is
only when the school authorities abuse this discretion that a court may
interfere with their decision to dismiss a student.93
The following reasons have been asserted for judicial reticence:
(1) judicial review of academic decisions would enormously encumber the
administration and operation of educational institutions;
(2) the specter of judicial review and adversary proceedings would subvert
and perhaps poison the relationships between student and teacher and
between student and school;
(3) courts are largely unqualified to judge the events of specialized and
subjective measures of academic performance.94
88. See text accompanying notes 91-94 infra.
89. See Annot., 86 A.L.R. 484 (1933). See also Dessem, Student Due Process Rights in
Academic Dismissals from the Public Schools, 5 J.L. & EDUc. 277 (1976).
90. 216 Mass. 19, 102 N.E. 1095 (1913).
91. Id. at 21, 102 N.E. at 1096.
92. 244 F. Supp. 156 (D. Vt. 1965).
93. Id. at 160.
94. These factors largely controlled the decision in Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78
(1978).
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b. Greenhill v. Bailey: An Exception to the Rule
Greenhill v. Bailey95 represents an exception to the no-intervention
rule. In Greenhill, a medical school dismissal case, the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff was entitled to a hearing in which
he might contest his dismissal. The distinguishing feature between
Greenhill and the general rule was that the school had "denigrate[d]
Greenhill's intellectual ability, as distinguished from his performance 96 on
his record and in a letter sent to the Association of American Medical
Colleges. These actions "deprived him of a significant interest in liberty,
for it admittedly imposed on him a stigma." 97 The distinction between an
academic dismissal standing by itself and an academic dismissal
accompanied by a negative characterization of a student's overall ability is
a difference in degree. The Greenhill holding, however, gave cognizance to
the notion of an evaluation-plus, with the plus taking the form of a stigma
likely to foreclose future opportunities.9"
c. Board of Curators v. Horowitz
The Supreme Court addressed the question of due process in
academic dismissals in the recent case of Board of Curators v. Horowitz.99
The court held that the plaintiff-medical student, whose performance had
been repeatedly evaluated by qualified medical personnel, had received all
the process she was due before dismissal. The court reached out to
distinguish Goss v. Lopez.'00 Goss, according to the court, dealt with
school disciplinary proceedings and had "sufficient resemblance to
traditional judicial and administrative factfinding to call for a
'hearing' ."'01 The Horowitz dispute, on the other hand, was occasioned by
an academic judgment and as a result demanded "far less stringent
procedural requirements. '0 2
Academic evaluations of a student, in contrast to disciplinary
determinations, bear little resemblance to the judicial and administrative
factfinding proceedings to which we have traditionally attached a full-
hearing requirement. In Goss, the school's decision to suspend the students
rested on factual conclusions that the individual students had participated in
demonstrations that had disrupted classes, attacked a police officer, or
95. 519 F.2d 5 (8th Cir. 1975).
96. Id. at 8.
97. Id.
98. The Supreme Court distinguished the Greenhill decision in Board of Curators v. Horowitz,
435 U.S. 78, 88 n.5.
99. 435 U.S. 78 (1978). For commentary on Horowitz, see Dessem, Board of Curators v.
Horowitz: Academic Versus Judicial Expertise, 39 OHIO ST. L.J.476(1978); Rosenberg, The Horowitz
Affair, 58 B. U. L. REv. 733 (1978); Vernon, Due Process Flexibility in Academic Dismissals:Horowitz
andBeyond, 8 J.L. & EDuC. 45 (1979); Comment, Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 47 U. CINN. L. REV.
514 (1978).
100. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
101. 435 U.S. at 88-89.
102. Id. at 86.
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caused physical damage to school property. The requirement of a hearing,
where the student could present his side of the factual issue, could under such
circumstances "provide a meaningful hedge against erroneous action." The
decision to dismiss respondent, by comparison, rested on the academic
judgment of school officials that she did not have the necessary clinical ability
to perform adequately as a medical doctor and was making insufficient
progress toward that goal. Such a judgment is by its nature more subjective
and evaluative than the typical factual questions presented in the average
disciplinary decision. Like the decision of an individual professor as to the
proper grade for a student in his course, the determination whether to dismiss
a student for academic reasons requires an expert evaluation of cumulative
information and is not readily adapted to the procedural tools of judicial or
administrative decision-making. 10
3
The Debra P. court acknowledged the Supreme Court's dis-
ciplinary/ academic dichotomy but noted that "the distinction between
what the rights of the two classes of individuals are is not clearly and
unequivocally drawn. '0 4 It then distinguished Debra P. from Horowitz
because of the factual differences between the two cases:
The practical problems in Horowitz were manifest. Sifting through an
individual student's past clinical record, rehashing physician evaluations, and
litigating bedside manner were problems foreign to judicial expertise. The
factual context in the instant case is very different. The Court is not asked to
evaluate an individual student's performance, but to resolve a dispute
involving the legislative decision to implement a test which determines
graduation from high school with the standard credential, a diploma. While
the factual inquiry is considerably different so are the parties. The Plaintiff in
Horowitz was pursuing graduate education in advanced studies. The
Plaintiffs in all classes in the instant case were participating in secondary
education required by the state compulsory education 
law.
Moreover, the Debra P. court's ruling did not jeopardize ongoing
student-teacher relationships because the FLE was a machine-scored,
objective, externally developed examination. Individual teachers had no
discretionary authority to exercise in regard to the FLE, as opposed to the
high degree of discretion necessarily exercised by the medical examiners in
Horowitz. Nor did the moratorium on the FLE program place an
administrative burden on the state because no elaborate hearing apparatus
needed to be created. In short, the factors that the Supreme Court found to
be controlling in Horowitz were largely absent or irrelevant in Debra P.
d. The Need For Adequate Notice
Although the court distinguished Horowitz, it did not accept the
103. Id. at 89-90 (citation omitted).
104. 474 F. Supp. at 265.
105. Id. at 266. Differences between the parties, their level of education, and the type of
certificate at issue also distinguish Debra P. from such cases as Tyler v. Vickery, 517 F.2d 1089 (5th Cir.
1975). In Tyler, the plaintiffs, black applicants to the bar who had failed the Georgia bar examination,
unsuccessfully challenged the constitutionality of the bar examination on equal protection grounds.
Clearly, however, a license to practice law and a high school diploma are not fungible.
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plaintiffs' contention that the FLE requirement was arbitrary and
capricious. It did, however, find a constitutional violation in the state's
implementation of the testing program. The court stated:
The Plaintiffs, after spending ten years in schools where their attendance was
compelled, were informed of a requirement concerning skills which, if taught;
should have been taught in grades they had long since completed. While it is
impossible to determine if all the skills were taught to all the students, it is
obvious that the instruction given was not presented in an educational
atmosphere directed by the existence of specific objectives and stimulated
throughout the period of instruction by a diploma sanction.
10 6
The court cited the case of Mahavongsanan v. Hall,'°7 which, while
upholding the decision to deny a student her masters degree for not
fulfilling all requirements, implicitly acknowledged that students have a
right to timely notice of major changes in the terms and conditions of their
schooling.
The Debra P. court's use of the term "notice" substantially broadened
the requirement of "timely notice"'10 8 alluded to in Hall. In Hall, the court
of appeals held that the plaintiff, who had two weeks' notice, had been
adequately notified of the pendency of a comprehensive examination. 19 In
Debra P. the court, in finding notice to have been inadequate, observed
that while "teachers were aware of the objectives of the functional literacy
examination four months in advance of the first administration . . . only
two months were available for instruction in the application of the
skills."" 0 The court read "notice" to mean more than merely apprising
Florida students of the imminence and importance of the FLE. Adequate
notice required that the students be made aware of their own scholastic
deficiencies and given appropriate instruction before being subjected to
the FLE. The type of notice envisaged by the court was designed to make
students aware of the state objectives and to provide educators with
sufficient time to develop FLE-based instructional strategies. The court
stated:
The principal problem with the instant program is that the instruction in
previous years took place in an atmosphere without the specific objectives
now present and without the diploma sanction. Instruction of the skills
necessary to successfully complete the functional literacy test is a cumulative
and time consuming process. Knowledge of how to successfully perform the
functional literacy skills is not taught in any specific grade, in any specific
class, or from any specific type of teacher. It is critical that at the time of
instruction of a functional literacy skill, the student knows that the individual
skill he is being taught must be learned prior to his graduation from a Florida
public school. Instruction in the specific skills is critical, but likewise so is
106. Id. at 267.
107. 529 F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1976).
108. Id. at 450.
109. 529 F.2d 448, 450 (5th Cir. 1976), reversing 401 F. Supp. 381, 383 (N.D. Ga. 1975).
110. 474 F. Supp. at 263.
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identification of whether the skills have been learned. Teaching and learning
are not always coterminous. . . .Until recently, there was no state wide
testing program to evaluate learning and to direct remediation.",
This expansive concept of notice, while novel, seemed appropriate in the
factual context presented by Debra P. A new set of educational objectives,
energized by the FLE and the diploma sanction, had been adopted in
considerable haste. There was serious doubt regarding whether the
requisite skills were taught "recently, well or perhaps at all"'1 2 to many
pupils. Thus, on the due process notice issue the court agreed with a
knowledgeable commentator who stated that "whatever notice is
considered adequate for the competency testing requirement, notice after




1. The Standards of Review
Traditionally, equal protection analysis has been structured in a two-
tiered system in which a rational basis test is applied in cases not involving
fundamental rights 114 or suspect classifications,115 and a strict scrutiny test
is applied when fundamental rights or suspect classifications, of which race
is the paradigm, are at issue. The test of rationality subjects the challenged
decision to a minimal level of review while strict scrutiny is almost always
"fatal in fact."11 6 The court in Debra P. was faced with the issue whether
the classifications created by the FLE requirement were racially based or
whether the test merely created the nonsuspect categories of passers and
failers.
The court found that the classifications created by the FLE
requirement were invidious to the extent they perpetuated past racially
discriminatory practices and hence strict scrutiny was applicable. It then
pinpointed the precise point in time when the classifications would be
transformed into the non-invidious categories of passers and failers,
whereupon the test of rationality would become the proper standard of
review. The state would thereafter be free to reinstitute its testing program
with the diploma sanction.1
17
111. Id. at 264 (citation omitted).
112. Id. at 265.
113. McClung, supra note 3, at 682.
114. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (right to vote); Shapiro v.Thompson, 394
U.S. 618 (1969) (right to travel); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (right to procreate).
Education is not a fundamental right. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,
35-37 (1978).
115. Classifications based on race or ancestry are suspect. See, e.g., Strauder v. West Virginia,
100 U.S. 303 (1880) (race).
116. Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a
Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. Rav. 1, 8 (1972). But see
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (racial classification upheld).
117. 474 F. Supp. at 269.
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2. Perpetuation of Prior Official Discrimination
Florida's prior history of racially discriminatory public education was
a major factor in the court's decision to forestall the imposition of the
diploma sanction. The court took judicial notice of the dual school system
operated by the state from 1885 to 1967 and determined from testimony
that Florida's schools remained segregated from 1967 to 1971, the
plaintiffs' first four years in school." 8 The court therefore concluded that
the Florida public schools were not physically integrated until the 1971-72
school year.1 9 This historical background was held to be similar to that of
Gaston County v. United States,20 a case which, although decided on
statutory grounds,' 21 exemplifies the perpetuation doctrine. Gaston in-
validated a racially neutral literacy test to determine voter eligibility
because, in light of North Carolina's prior history of complete educational
segregation, "[i]mpartial administration of the literacy test today would
serve only to perpetuate these [past] inequities in a different form."'22 The
perpetuation doctrine posits that ostensibly neutral government acts
cannot reinforce past constitutional violations.
The court then looked to cases that have considered perpetuation in
the context of public education. These cases deal respectively with
desegregation and ability grouping. Desegregation cases were cited for the
proposition, recently reiterated in Columbus Board of Education v.
Penick '23 and Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman,24 that school
authorities are charged with an affirmative duty to remedy the ongoing
effects of past purposeful discrimination.
The ability grouping cases121 served as an example of how ostensibly
neutral educational practices, including standardized testing, can
perpetuate past constitutional violations in recently desegregated districts.
"Ability grouping is the practice of arranging groups of students in
different sections or classrooms within a grade and assigning different
118. Id. at 250-51.
119. Id. at 252.
120. 395 U.S. 285 (1969); See also Griggs v. Duke Power, 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (intelligence test as
job requirement).
121. The case was brought under The Voting Rights Act of 1965.42 U.S.C. §§ 1971,1973-1973p
(1976).
122. 395 U.S. at 297.
123. 443 U.S. 449 (1979).
124. 443 U.S. 526 (1979).
125. E.g., McNeal v. Tate County School Dist., 508 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1975); Hobson v.
Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), affd sub nom. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir.
1969) (en banc). United States v.Tunica County School Dist., 421 F. 2d 1236 (5th Cir. 1970); Singleton
v. Jackson Mun. Sep. School Dist., 419 F.2d 1211(5th Cir. 1970); Moses v. Washington Parish School
Bd., 330 F. Supp. 1340 (E.D. La. 1971); See also R. MILLS & M. BRYAN, TESTING . . . GROUPING:
THE NEW SEGREGATION IN SOUTHERN SCHOOLS (1976) [hereinafter cited as NEW SEGREGATION]; Shea,
An Educational Perspective of the Legality of Intelligence Testing and Ability Grouping, 6 J.L. &
EDUC. 137 (1977); Sorgen, Testing and Tracking in Public Schools, 24 HASTINGS L. J. 1129 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Testing and Tracking].
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teachers to these groups."'126 It can create intraschool segregation because
students who have an inferior educational background are clustered in the
lower tracks. 127 Moreover, the placement mechanism, generally standard-
ized testing, often operates to the detriment of minority pupils. 28 Several
cases have proscribed 29 or delayed 30 these homogenous grouping
schemes.
The ability grouping cases were also important because they provided
a standard of review by analogy. The analogy was apt because Florida's
FLE requirement can be characterized as out-the-door ability grouping.
The court quoted the test developed by the Fifth Circuit in McNeal v.
Tate:'
The testing rationale of both Singleton [v. Jackson Mun. Sep. School
Dist. 132], and Lemon [v. Bossier Parish School Bd.,'33] would bar the use of
this method of assignment until the district has operated as a unitary system
without such assignments for a sufficient period of time to assure that the
underachievement of the slower groups is not due to yesterday's educational
disparities. Such a bar period may be lifted when the district can show that
steps taken to bring disadvantaged students to peer status have ended the
educational disadvantages caused by prior segregation. 34
The remedy in Debra P. included a "bar period" similar to McNeal. Lifting
of the bar period, however, seemed to be based at least in part on factors
other than those expressly stated in MeNeal. While McNeal looked to the
"steps taken to bring disadvantaged students to peer status," the court in
Debra P. linked the bar period to the date when segregation in Florida's
schools had ended. 35
3. The Effect of Pre-1971 Violations of Equal Protection
The Debra P. court cited Green v. County School Board of New Kent
County 36 for the proposition that "not only was it necessary to eliminate
126. NEW SEGREGATION, supra note 125, at 2. The practice is widespread in the South. Id. at46-
47.
127. See, e.g., Moses v. Washington Parish School Bd., 330 F. Supp. 1340,1343 (E.D. La. 1971)
(the lowest tracks were comprised entirely of black students in the challenged grouping plan); Hobson
v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 511-14 (D.D.C. 1967), affd sub nom. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175
(D.C. Cir. 1969) (en banc) (which detailed the operations of the Washington, D.C. ability grouping
scheme. The plan severely curtailed the educational opportunities of black pupils). Ability grouping
tends to be self-fulfilling because, not surprisingly, those who are taught less learn less. McNealv.Tate
County School Dist., 508 F.2d 1017, 1020 (5th Cir. 1975).
128. Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967) afj'd sub nom. Smuck v. Hobson, 408
F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (en banc), provided a dramatic example. When school personnel employed
evaluative techniques other than standardized tests, they learned that two-thirds of the re-evaluated
students would have been placed erroneously in the lowest track. 269 F. Supp. at 490.
129. Id. at 515 (track system "abolished").
130. See, e.g., McNeal v. Tate County School Dist., 508 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1975).
131. Id.
132. 419 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir. 1969).
133. 444 F.2d 1400 (5th Cir. 1971).
134. 508 F.2d at 1020-21.
135. See text accompanying notes 139-42 infra.
136. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
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physical segregation of public schools, but it was also necessary to elimi-
nate the effects of such purposeful discrimination."' 3 7 The court then noted
that "the principal effect of the dual school system was the inferior educa-
tion given black school children."' 38 Thus,* while Florida's schools had
been physically integrated since 1971, the learning deficits created during
the dual school period had not been overcome, notwithstanding the post-
1977 remedial efforts. The court's analysis placed pivotal significance on
1971, the first year of integrated schooling in Florida.
The fact that the plaintiffs were denied equal protection in the pre-
1971 period by virtue of their enrollment in segregated schools shifted the
burden to the state to show that the prior discrimination was not the cause
of the disproportionate FLE failure rate. The court found that the "[d]e-
fendants ... failed to rebut the fact that the disproportionate failure of
[black students] resulted from the inferior education they received during
the dual school system portion of their education."'139 Whether the state
defendants could have rebutted the claim that the high black failure rate
and prior official discrimination were causally related is questionable in
light of other language in the opinion. The court stated: "When students
regardless of race are permitted to commence and pursue their education
in a unitary school system without taint of the dual school system, then a
graduation requirement based on a neutral test will be permitted.', 40 If
students must "commence and pursue their education in a unitary school
system" before a test-based graduation requirement may be imposed, then
the fact that students attended an unconstitutional dual school system for
any length of time appears to control.
In the event of subsequent cases challenging MCT programs, howev-
er, particularly in school districts that have been required to desegregate
within the last several years, the opportunity to show effective affirmative
action to correct the effects of past segregation may be significant. The
alternative, requiring students to commence their education in a unitary
system, would delay implementation of MCT as a graduation requirement
for a decade or more in many districts.'41 The latter approach, making the
bar period coincide with the length of time required to filter all the victims
of prior constitutional violations through the system, simplifies the judicial
task. Using the date of integration as a date of demarcation frees the court
from having to determine the efficacy of remedial and compensatory
programs. On the other hand, a "commence and pursue" requirement
necessarily burdens recently desegregated school districts that contem-
137. 474 F. Supp. at 256.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 256.
140. Id. at 257 (emphasis added).
141. If Ohio, for example, were to implement an FLE-type graduation requirement, under a
commence and pursue standard, it would have to wait until 1992 to put the program into effect
statewide because several of the state's largest school districts, including Cleveland, Columbus,
Dayton, did not desegregate their schools until the 1979-80 school year.
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plate the imposition of an FLE-type graduation requirement. The overrid-
ing considerations in Debra P., however, were the court's "serious reserva-
tions about attaching a constitutional imprimatur to a program which
penalizes students who have been denied equal opportunity.'142 The court
then sharply distinguished the situation of post-1971 enrollees.
4. The Post-1971 Period: Present Intent to Discriminate
a. The Intent Conundrum
A formerly vexing question in equal protection cases was whether
discrimination was to be measured by purpose or effect or some combina-
tion of the two. The Debra P. court relied on a series of Supreme Court
cases beginning with Washington v. Davis143 for its conclusion that the
challenged statutory scheme, although tainted by past segregation, did not
manifest present intent to discriminate. Since Washington, which denied
the claims of black applicants who challenged an allegedly discriminatory
employment test administered by the District of Columbia, subjective
intent has been the dominant factor in the purpose/effect dichotomy.
Accordingly, "the invidious quality of a law claimed to be racially discrimi-
natory must ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory purpose.,
144
As for discriminatory effect, the Washington Court stated that "[d]ispro-
portionate impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone of
invidious racial discrimination forbidden by the Constitution. 145
The court further developed the Washington doctrine in Village of
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.,46 acase
challenging an allegedly racially discriminatory zoning decision that
blocked construction of an integrated housing project. Arlington Heights
enunciated "subjects of proper inquiry in determining whether racially
discriminatory intent existed."' 147 These subjects included (1) a dispropor-
tionate impact ("an important starting point"f' 48); (2) the historical setting;
(3) the specific events surrounding the challenged action; (4) departures
from normal procedures; and (5) contemporaneous public statements by
the decisionmakers.149 The Court also indicated that finding an impermiss-
ible purpose might not operate to invalidate the challenged decision and
thereby end the inquiry. Instead, proof of a discriminatory purpose would
"have shifted to the Village the burden of establishing that the same
decision would have resulted even had the impermissible purpose not been
142. 474 F. Supp. at 256.
143. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
144. Id. at 240.
145. Id. at 242.
146. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
147. Id. at 268.
148. Id. at 266.
149. Id. at 266-68.
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considered."'"5 This burden shifting device made a plaintiffs task more
formidable because once an impermissible purpose to discriminate was
demonstrated, the defendant could rebut by showing that the intended
discrimination was not a "but-for" factor in the decisionmaker's delibera-
tions.
After Washington, a number of courts of appeal had approached the
purpose/effect question by a "natural, probable, and foreseeable" test.' 5'
This "objective standard" viewed the challenged decision in terms of its
foreseeable consequences. Using this test, if the natural, foreseeable result
of a government policy had demonstrably more severe effects on minori-
ties, a presumption of discriminatory purpose arose which the defendant
could rebut by showing that the decision was not racially motivated or
that the same decision would have been reached in the absence of the im-
proper purpose. However, as one commentator has noted:
This "foreseeability" structure of inquiry into motivation conflicts with
the structure designed by the Supreme Court in Arlington Heights. The
disproportionate racial impact of virtually every facially neutral decision
disproportionately disadvantaging nonwhites is "natural and foreseeable,"
and thus the former structure displaces the latter. The principal practical
difference between the two structures concerns the burden of proving race-
dependency: under Arlington Heights the challenging party must show that
racial considerations were a motivating factor; under the foreseeability
structure the challenging party need show only what will virtually always be
obvious anyway-that the disproportionate disadvantage suffered by non-
whites is the natural and foreseeable consequence of the facially neutral
decision-in order to shift to the defendant the burden of proving that racial
considerations were not a but-for cause of the challenged decision.1
52
Thus, to the extent the "foreseeability" test is a disproportionate racial
impact test in another guise, it is out of harmony with Washington and
Arlington Heights.
The Court spoke on the proper role of foreseeability in Personnel
Administrator v. Feeney:
53
"Discriminatory purpose," however, implies more than intent as volition
or intent as awareness of consequences. It implies that the decisionmaker, in
this case a state legislature, selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action
at least in part "because of', not merely "in spite of," its adverse effects upon
an identifiable group. 54
150. Id. at 270-71 n.21.
151. See, e.g., Arthur v. Nyquist, 573 F.2d 134 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 860 (1978); United
States v. Texas Educ. Agency, 564 F.2d 162(5th Cir. 1977); United States v. School Dist., 521 F.2d 530
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 946 (1975); Morgan v. Kerrigan, 509 F.2d 580 (1st Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975); Oliver v. Michigan State Bd. of Educ., 508 F.2d 178 (6th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975); United States v. Board of School Comm'rs, 474 F.2d 81 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 413 U.S. 920 (1973).
152. Perry, Modem Equal Protection: A Conceptualization and Appraisal, 79 CoLuM. L. REv.
1023, 1038 (1979).
153. 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
154. Id. at 279 (citation omitted). See also Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526,536
n.9 (1979).
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Feeney's "because of" test does for objective intent what Arlington Heights
did for subjective intent. Foreseeability is not enough to show invidious
intent just as disproportionate impact and a non-but-for discriminatory
purpose are insufficient to trigger an equal protection violation. Feeney,
however, while narrowing the role of foreseeability, did not foreclose the
use of objective criteria altogether. In a footnote, the Court in Feeney
stated that "this is not to say that the inevitability or foreseeability of
consequences of a neutral rule has no bearing on the existence of
discriminatory intent." '155
b. Intent in Debra P.
The Debra P. court applied the Feeney "because of" test and found no
present intent to discriminate because it had insufficient proof "that the
motivation for implementing the program was in Feeney terms 'because of
the large black failure statistics.' 56 Feeney, however, cited Washington v.
Davis for the proposition that "an invidious discriminatory purpose may
often be inferred from the totality of the relevant facts."' 157 Consideration
of the totality of the circumstances in Debra P. was limited to finding that
the state had "a legitimate interest in implementing a test to evaluate the
established statewide objectives.' 58
In Feeney, the Court attributed particular significance to the fact that
the Massachusetts veteran's prefererice dated back almost a century and
found no present intent to discriminate. In Debra P., by contrast, the court
was confronted with a new, unproved program that contemplated rigorous
sanctions never before imposed. Although the court chronicled Florida's
history of segregated public schooling, and acknowledged the
recalcitrance with which integration was accepted, it did not link the
challenged statutory scheme causally with the integration of Florida's
schools. 5 9 A finding of present intent might have resulted if the court had
considered desegregation and minimum competency testing as significant
and intertwined threads in the whole cloth of Florida public education.
c. Debra P. Compared to Riles
It is instructive to compare the Debra P. court's finding of no present
intent to discriminate with the intent analysis in the recent California
federal district court case of Larry P. v. Riles. 60 Riles enjoined on
155. 442 U.S. at 279 n.25.
156. 474 F. Supp. at 254.
157. 426 U.S, at 242.
158. 474 F. Supp. at 254.
159. "Some black parents in desegregated communities see a racial motive behind competency
testing. They say that competency testing was not a concern at either black or white schools until the
schools in their district were desegregated, at which time competency testing was introduced to protect
standards." McClung, supra note 3, at 688. Rep. Shirley Chisholm, New York, has stated that "[ilt is no
accident that black students fail at a much higher rate than whites." Columbus Dispatch, Feb. 18,1980
at C-8, Col. 4.
160. No. C-71-2270 R.F.P. (N.D. Cal. Oct. 16,1979)appealdocketedNo. 80-4027(9thCir.Jan.
17, 1980), summarized at 48 U.S.L.W. 2298 (Oct. 30,1979). Riles has a lengthy procedural history. See
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statutory and constitutional grounds the use of standardized intelligence
(IQ) tests as a criterion for placing pupils in classes for the educable
mentally retarded (EMR). While Riles might have rested on the statutory
claims, 61 the court felt it "inappropriate"'62 not to discuss the con-
stitutional ramifications. The Riles court reprised the Washington,
Arlington Heights, and Feeney holdings and the ever-narrowing standard
of invidious intent that these cases established.163  It nevertheless
determined that strict scrutiny was the proper standard after subjecting the
Riles facts to an analysis based on the factors enumerated in Arlington
Heights. This analysis revealed the following:
Admittedly a number of reasons can explain a lack of attention to a
problem such as that of disproportionate enrollment, but the clear pattern
cannot be ignored. The facts permit but one inference, and the state has not
offered evidence that permits any other inference. Despite the admitted
problems with the I.Q. tests, and despite disproportionate enrollments which
had even been condemned by the legislature, the [State Department of
Education's] actions revealed a complacent acceptance of those dispropor-
tions, and that complacency was evidently built on easy but unsubstantiated
assumptions about the incidence of retardation or at least low intelligence
among black children. Coupled with the affirmative decision to adopt the
requirement of particular I.Q. tests in 1969, that complacent acceptance must
be seen as a desire to perpetuate the segregation of minorities in inferior, dead
end, and stigmatizing classes for the retarded. 64
Applying the Riles analysis to Debra P., the "complacent acceptance"
of the disproportionate failure rate was, to paraphrase, evidently built on
easy assumptions about the incidence of low achievement among black
children.165 The segregative intent in Debra P. was not necessarily to hurt
black children, but it was an intent to designate a grossly disproportionate
number of black children as functional illiterates when the preliminary
screening of the FLE indicated that a high percentage of black students
would not pass the test. 166 The distinguishing features of the two cases-IQ
343 F. Supp. 1306 (N.D. Cal. 1972), affd, 502 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1974) (temporary injunction on
intelligence testing for special class placement).
161. The claims were predicated on the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 20
U.S.C. §§ 1401-1461 (1976).
162. No. C-71-2270 R.F.P., slip op. at 75.
163. Id. at 75-92.
164. Id. at 91-92.
165. E.g., "One official of the State Department of Education estimated that the failure rate
among Black students would eventually exceed 75 percent of those taking the test. He said
that this state of affairs did not come as a surprise to him since he expected in all cases a high
failure rate among Blacks. . . .The state testing director suggested that Blacks traditionally
score lower than Whites on achievement tests and the Florida Literacy Test was not expected
to provide an exceptional case."
NEA REPORT, supra note 3, at 11.
166. Cf. Note, Discriminatory Purpose and Disproportionate Impact: An Assessment After
Feeney, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1376 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Assessment After Feeney]:
The plaintiffs in Feeney conceded that the law had a legitimate purpose: aiding veterans. This,
of course, suggests that the legislature would have passed a veterans' preference law even if it
did not have an adverse impact on women; thus, it can in no way be said that the veterans'
preference law would have been enacted only if it had an adverse impact. But it is entirely
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tests as opposed to the FLE167 and the use of test results for special class
placement rather than as a graduation requirement-do not negate their
commonality. The central factor in both cases was the affirmative decision
to use standardized tests instrumentally in a manner that dispropor-
tionately and foreseeably burdened minority students and limited
subsequent educational and employment opportunities. The differing
results in terms of present intent to discriminate in Debra P. and Riles
illustrate the interpretative difficulties created by the recent Supreme
Court pronouncements on discriminatory intent.
168
d. Passers and Failers
The plaintiffs in Debra P. mounted a full-scale attack on the FLE
claiming that the test "ha[d] not been properly validated for administra-
tion to racial or ethnic minorities, '  that it was not "related to the
curriculum or instruction with which . . . the plaintiffs ha[d] been
provided," 170 that the cutoff score had been arbitrarily determined,'17 and
that "individual items . . . [were] less likely to be answered correctly by
black students than by whites." 172 The court largely rejected these claims
but not before it had received "an education in 'state of the art' educational
measurement and testing."'173 This "education" revealed a number of
psychometric flaws in the Florida test. These flaws, however, were
relegated to the following footnote:
Among the flaws asserted and considered were: the failure of DOE to solicit
public input into the design of the test and its definition; the drafting of item
specifications after the writing of items; the continual use by DOE of
definitions of functional literacy extraneous and inconsistent with the official
definition; the inadequacy of the research prior to the selection of a cut-score;
the questionable research methodology of the Defendants' construct validity
study; the failure to follow the APA standards for the design and
implementation of tests which affect the lives of the takers in a significant
fashion; the failure of DOE to adequately publicize what the test is and its
inherent limitations; the inadequacy of the form notice sent to parents and
students regarding the interpretations of scores on the test; the reliability of
the test. While some of the above mentioned flaws were indeed errors of
consistent with this analysis to conclude further that the legislature would not have enacted a
preference with such a devastating effect on women unless it held the view that it was
unimportant for women to have an opportunity for meaningful employment.
Id. at 1398.
167. "There is no clear line between the skills measured by standard IQ tests and the skills
measured by tests of verbal and nonverbal ability." C. JENCKS, INEQUALITY 57 (1972).
168. Cf. Assessment After Feeney, supra note 166, at 1377 ("discriminatory purpose continues
to be both a controversial facet of constituional law and a standard that has been inconsistently applied
in the lower courts") (footnotes omitted).




173. 474 F. Supp. at 261.
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considerable magnitude, they do not cross either individually or collectively
the line between inadequacy and constitutional infirmity.'1
4
Notwithstanding these flaws, the court limited its analysis of the test
to the question whether the "test utilized was a valid and reasonable
measure for dividing students into classifications for the purpose of high
school graduation.' 75 It analogized its approach to Title VII testing
standards and cited Griggs v. Duke Power176 and Armstead v. Starkville
Municipal Separate School District.177 Griggs, a Supreme Court case
decided on title VII1 78 grounds, held that a non-job related employment
test and diploma requirement were invalid because they served to exclude
black workers. The challenged criteria lacked a "manifest relationship"
1 79
to the job and thus could not be used. Armstead was decided on
constitutional grounds and held that conclusive use of a cutoff score on the
Graduate Record Examination (GRE) for purposes of hiring and retaining
teachers was irrational and hence a violation of the equal protection
clause. 80 While Griggs and Armstead matched the challenged test to a
particular job, Debra P. matched the test to the state objectives and the
state-prescribed definition of functional literacy.81 Applying the equal
174. Id. at 261 n.23.
175. Id. at 260. The court looked to the APA STANDARDS, supra note 29, to assess whether the
FLE had adequate content and construct validity. Content validity exists if a test measures what it is
designed to measure. "To demonstrate the content validity of a set of test scores, one must show that the
behaviors demonstrated in testing constitute a representative sample of behaviors to be exhibited in a
desired performance domain." Id. at 28. Construct validity exists if the test is consistent with its
underlying construct, "a theoretical idea developed to explain and to organize some aspects of existing
knowledge." Id. at 29. The court determined that the FLE was consistent with the state objectives
(content) and the state's official definition of functional literacy (construct). The court acknowledged
that there were at least eleven other definitions of functional literacy but limited its validity inquiry to
the state's definition: "[Flunctional literacy is the satisfactory application of basic skills in reading,
writing and arithmetic, to problems and tasks of a practical nature as encountered in everyday life." 474
F. Supp. at 258. The court did not rule on the FLE's predictive validity, see A.P.A. at 39, or its
concurrent validity, that is, how well the FLE correlated with other measures of school performance.
See id.
176. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
177. 461 F.2d. 276 (5th Cir. 1972).
178. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§2000e-2000e(17) (1976).
179. 401 U.S. at 432.Griggs illustrates Berg's thesis, supra note 65. that educational requirements
for most jobs serve primarily to narrow the applicant pool notwithstanding the reasonable but,
according to Berg, unsubstantiated belief of employers that better educated workers are necessarily
better workers. The Court in Griggs expressed its disapproval of this type of credentialism:
The facts of this case demonstrate the inadequacy of broad and general testing devices as
well as the infirmity of using diplomas or degrees as fixed measures of capability. History is
filled with examples of men and women who rendered highly effective performance without
the conventional badges of accomplishment in terms of certificates, diplomas, or degrees.
Diplomas and tests are useful servants, but Congress has mandated the commonsense
proposition that they are not to become masters of reality.
401 U.S. at 433.
180. But see United States v. South Carolina, 445 F. Supp. 1094 (D.S.C. 1977), affd mem., 434
U.S. 1026 (1978) (use of National Teachers Examination (N.T.E.) as criterion for teacher certification
and promotion upheld). The South Carolina judgment countered earlier cases disallowing the N.T.E.
as a job requirement, e.g., United States v. North Carolina, 400 F. Supp. 343 (E.D.N.C. 1975), vacated,
425 F. Supp. 789 (E.D.N.C. 1977).
181. 474 F. Supp. at 260.
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protection rational relation test, (not a "manifest relation" test) the court
found that the FLE bore "a rational relation to a valid state interest.'
8 2
III. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH
Donald Lewis suggests18 3 that questions of test validity and suitability
should be analyzed in due process terms when life-shaping decisions are
based on test results.
The inquiry under the equal protection clause asks only whether there is a
rational relationship between the testing device which creates the challenged
classifications, and a legitimate state purpose. The nature of the judicial task
differs under the due process clause, which requires the state to implement
procedures designed to minimize erroneous deprivations of private interests
in property and liberty. A standard of test validation sufficient to show a
rational relationship to the substance of state law may still be too weak to
serve as an adequate procedural mechanism to ensure the accuracy demanded
by the due process clause as construed in Eldridge.
8 4
He cites the utilitarian standard of Matthews v. Eldridges5 as a model. The
Eldridge test balances these factors:
First the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the
risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used,
and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or
substitute procedural requirement would entail. 8 6
The Eldridge formula can be applied to Debra P. First, the private
interests affected by the official action were substantial in that future
opportunities and personal reputations were jeopardized. 87 Second, the
risk of erroneous deprivation, although mitigated somewhat by the retake
process and remediation, was greater than it might have been if the
program did not rely exclusively on a single mode of evaluation. In other
contexts reliance on test scores as the sole basis for life-shaping decisions
has been proscribed. The reasons for the proscription are illustrated by this
182. Id. at 261. The court's inquiry into the cultural bias of the test was also low level.The court
determined that there was no unconstitutional bias in the test questions. Id. at 261-62.
The court's Griggs discussion may ultimately be a source of confusion. Notwithstanding the reference
to Griggs, the court did not apply the stringent Title VII testing standards, 29 C.F.R. § 1607. If, how-
ever, employers subsequently base hiring decisions on the FLE, then the test might qualify as an
employment test subject to Title VII standards and the employers' failure to comply with these stan-
dards may create liability under the statute. See, e.g., Equal Employment Opportunity Comm. De-
cision No. 71-2229, 4 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 249 (1971) (policy of awarding job placement points on
basis of grades in certain high school courses violates Title VII employment testing rules).
183. Lewis, Certifying Functional Illiteracy: Competency Testing and Implications for Due
Process and Equal Education Opportunity, 8 J.L. & EDUC. 145 (1979).
184. Id. at 161 n.117.
185. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
186. Id. at 335. Justice Marshall stated that an Eldridge-type inquiry should have been utilized in
Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 97-108 (Marshall, J., concurring and dissenting).
187. See text accompanying notes 65-86 supra.
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excerpt from the legislative history of the Education for All Handicapped
Children Act of 1975:188
The Committee is alarmed about the abuses which occur in the testing
and evaluation of children, and is concerned that expertise in the proper use
of testing and evaluation procedures falls far short of the prolific use and
development of testing and evaluation tools. The usefulness and mechanistic
ease of testing should not become so paramount in the educational process
that the negative effects of such testing are overlooked. 89
The regulations promulgated under the Act specify that no single test or
procedure should be used as the sole criterion for placement.190 This
rationale for multicriteria evaluations does not lose its force when applied
to the vast majority of pupils who are not handicapped. Moreover, multi-
criteria evaluations serve the state's asserted interest in upgrading stu-
dent achievement without incurring additional fiscal and administrative
burdens.
The advantage of this approach is that it values accuracy over
expediency when a significant interest is at stake. If the Debra P. court had
utilized the Eldridge procedural due process analysis, the various flaws in
the Florida testing scheme, which "were indeed errors of considerable
magnitude,"'191 might have risen to the level of a constitutional violation
not only because pretest notice was inadequate but because the FLE
program was riddled with educational and psychometric irregularities.
Another reason for holding educational testing to higher standards of
accuracy than employment testing is that while the primary purpose of an
employer's enterprise is to produce a product or provide a service to which
end employment testing is but an incidental function, a primary purpose of
contemporary schooling is to evaluate, to sort and select students in a
manner that encourages each individual student to exploit his or her ability
to the fullest.192 The waste of human potential is the necessary consequence
of miscalculations in the educational sorting process.' 93 This consequence
is sufficiently undesirable as to require decisionmaking procedures that
minimize the likelihood of error.
The public schools, which were originally designed to serve a
declassificatory function, have emerged as America's principal social
sorting institution. 194 For a long while the schools rejected the role of social
188. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1461 (1976).
189. 3[1975] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD NEWS 1453; Cf. APA, supra note 29, at 72-73.
190. 45 C.F.R. § 121a.532d (1979).
191. 474 F. Supp. at 261 n.23.
192. See Kirp, Schools as Sorters: The Constitutional and Policy Implications of Student
Classifications, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 705 (1973). Cf. Larry P. v. Riles, No. C-71-2270 R.F.P. (N.D. Cal.
Oct. 16, 1979) (employment and educational testing contrasted).
193. See Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967) aff'dsub nom. Smuck v. Hobson,
408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (en banc).
194. See J. SPRING, THE SORTING MACHINE: NATIONAL EDUCATIONAL POLICY SINCE 1945
(1976).
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sifting mechanisms.1 95 This lofty stance, however, gave way to an
acknowledgment of the sorting out function that schools had always
performed. The NEA Report addressed this point and noted the change in
the nature of this sorting process in recent decades:
In the past the schools sorted their students, giving failing grades to those
who had difficulty in learning and encouraging those who learned easily. And
while most of the other students went on to graduate from high school, those
who received low grades soon dropped out and found jobs requiring little
education. This practice is no longer acceptable in a technological nation.
Those who drop out are largely unemployable and live on welfare funds.
Hence, young people are urged to stay in school and the school is expected to
find ways of teaching those who do not respond to traditional educational
practices. This is a new task for American schools and most of them need
assistance in learning how to effectively teach children who in the past have
not learned easily. Against this background the panel has studied the
Accountability Act and particularly the Florida Program of Minimum
Competency Testing, seeking to evaluate its impact on students, parents,
teachers, and the local schools.
196
School classifications, moreover, have become ever more fine as a result of
an expanded educational and institutional framework and the disparate
needs of a technologically and sociologically complex society.197 In short,
it is difficult to overemphasize the imperativeness of accuracy in the life-
shaping decisions made by school officials. Thus, as a matter of procedural
due process, if not equal protection, sound test instruments and sound
testing practices must support important school classifications that are
likely to affect dramatically the direction and scope of students' future
endeavors.
IV. CONCLUSION
Debra P. places two burdens on MCT programs: first, school districts
that plan to link the diploma with a passing score on a competency test
must give students adequate notice, with notice expansively defined to
include notification, diagnosis of scholastic deficiencies, and pre- and post-
test remediation. Second, school districts with a prior history of
purposeful discrimination may not use the diploma sanction in a way that
compounds past constitutional violations.
It is important to note that both of these judicial constraints relate
principally to matters of timing. Neither the FLE itself nor the reliance on
standardized testing as a conclusive mode of evaluation were found to be
constitutionally faulty notwithstanding the flaws in the test instrument and
the educational unsoundness of basing a major decision on a single
195. H. PERKINSON, THE IMPERFECT PANACEA: AMERICAN FAITH IN EDUCATION 1865-1976,145-
46 (1977).
196. NEA REPORT, supra note 3, at 2.
197. "The process of sorting and labeling may be required to some extent by the specialized and
differentiated demands of modern society and economy." Sorgen, supra note 125, at 1133.
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variable. It is submitted that the court should have scrutinized the test and
its proposed use more vigorously because "the misuse of tests seems to be a
recurrent factor in American education."' 98 It is further submitted that an
Eldridge-type inquiry would satisfy the state's desire to upgrade
achievement levels while ensuring that the test instruments and procedures
would be accurate and fair, thus minimizing the risk of erroneous
deprivation. The gloomy experiences of minority pupils 99 in other testing
contexts reiterate the need for accurate evaluative practices when
significant interests are at stake.
Steven Schreiber
198. R. HOFSTADTER, supra note 37, at 339.
199. See, e.g., Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967) aff'd sub nom. Smuck v.
Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (en banc); Larry P. v. Riles, No. C-71-2270 R.F.P. (N.D. Cal.
Oct. 16, 1979); Moses v. Washington Parish School Bd., 330 F. Supp. 1340 (E.D. LA. 1971). Cf.
DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312,335 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (LSAT disserves minorities);
White, Culturally Biased Testing and Predictive Invalidity: Putting Them on the Record, 14 HARV.
C.R. REv. 89 (1979) (cultural bias in undergraduate and professional school admission tests).
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